CONCLUDING REMARKS

The paper has examined the public decision process for the Storebælt fixed link in a historical perspective, pointing to the peculiar project plans and product specifications for the varying technology elements of the link. This was indeed a story of social constructivism. It exposed the lengthy momentum of socio-political procedures originating from classical Danish social-democratic divide and rule traditions which, however, from the late 70s have been increasingly influenced by supranational regulative measures as well as by the internationali-sation of construction business and technology in general. Thus the paper outlines the multitude of interests which led to an agreement about the design of a combined, time-lagged fixed link, encompassing heterogeneous specifications for the road and railway parts of the link. Couched in techno-economic rationality this decision endeavoured to comply with seriously conflicting criteria. As shown, however, the possibilities of achieving overall project success in this environment of multiplicity were condemned to be dim. As one crucial area of dispute and hence contractual success the paper has identified the interpretation of and dialogue about the client’s technical specifications. But also the encounter between culturally determined managerial and organisational preferences embedded in different national regulative systems was immense - within the various joint venture organisations as well as in relation to the client. Such issues repeatedly caused delays and budget overruns and were subject to litigation. The Storebælt fixed link project is a long history of technological incompability, experienced by social actors on all levels in client, design and production organisations. As shown much of this inconsistancy originated in external (i.e. political) spheres and thus beyond the immediate reach of the most exposed, productive parties. Seen in this light, however, the production of the fixed link also becomes a case of successful performance, demonstrated - ’against poor odds’ - at the micro level by managers, technicians and operators. Technological disasters, budget overruns and planning hurdles were eventually tackled with great innovativeness and collaborative ingenuity in the multicultural environment of professionals and nationalities. And the link was actually completed and is now in full operation. But a crucial issue of technology management remain unresolved after this huge project as well as in construction in general: how to exploit the good and bad learning produced in temporary, loosely coupled organisations for the benefit of future projects. The client A/S Storebælt in fact does deploy a knowledge transfer strategy for the current Øresund fixed link project. Whether this initiative will actually come through as organisational learning and improved project performance is still to be demonstrated.