SETTING UP A CLIENT

As specified in the Parliament agreement of June 1987 the client company A/S Storebæltsforbindelsen (The Great Belt Link Ltd.) was established as a state owned principal to the project. The company's purpose was to design, construct and operate the fixed link. As mentioned earlier, bridge and road infrastructure projects in Denmark had never before been organised in a BOOT-setup, and, indeed, the specific model chosen in some respects differs rather much from being a "real concessionaire" (Martinand 1993). The idea of having a limited company in charge of the project instead of the Road Directorate or State Railways under the Ministry of Traffic eventually materialised during the social construction of the decision on the fixed link (Bonke 1996), in fact together with the 3-year time-lag issue as the main "piece of candies" or bait for the hesitating actors. Seen in this social constructivist perspective it was an obvious act of closure to encircle the project in a quasi-private organisation, out of reach of unpredictable political interests which could block the annual State Budget negotiations. Furthermore as indicated, the concessionaire model was in fine accordance with the ideology of privatisation which from the early 80s has been dominating the public debate about the inefficiencies of institutions in the post-war social-democratic state. This argument, however, had no bearing in recent performance of the Road Directorate whose previous fixed link project, the Farø Bridges, in the mid 1980s had been completed on time within a 2% budget excess. The official background for the replacement of the Road Directorate as acting principal on the project is mainly to be found in the financial aspects of the agreement in the Public Works Act. A limited company could independently raise loans and subsequently run the project economy sheltered from general political and public interference. In contrast, the Road Directorate, being a state institution, which was obliged to operate within the annually agreed limits of the State Budget and was furthermore subject to a law on freedom of information. When the state principal in "real" concession contract situations delegates its power to a private limited company it is evidently ascribing priority more to the outcome of a project than to the process through which the specific outcome is being produced (Bourgeat et al. 1997, p.22). This renunciation of managerial influence is in principle compensated by the selection of a qualified concessionaire as well as in the specific terms of the concession contract. From a legal point of view, however, these means of control oblige the principal to possess an advanced preconceptual understanding of the project and to be very explicit and detailed in its statements. Such foresight in itself has basic limitations in construction. But the weaknesses of the concession model become obvious if, furthermore, the principal prefers to maintain some influence as technology manager throughout the project phases. According to act of parliament, the preparation of A/S Storebælt as the concessionaire/ client in particular should allow for the conflict between the political, economical and technological interests of the state principal: The intention of the act concerning this new type of client is to combine the knowledge, qualities and possibilities inherent in the traditional organisation of public works under ministries with the financial independence of a limited liability company and the culture of private contractors. The client is in charge of construction under the provisions of the public Act and to existing Danish tender and design practices. And the Act is specifies particular obligations on the client: it shall manage the public funds on a business basis, i.e. balancing expenses, incomes and interests, it shall act as a main political actor in transports, and it shall deploy an environmental policy. As a means of mediating the interaction between A/S Storebæltsforbindelsen and society two governing bodies were then established - a board of directors and a political monitoring committee. This twofold "belt and braces" organisation aimed to provide a watertight guarantee against unruly conduct by the principal. Obviously the state, being the sole shareholder, could all by itself nominate the members for the board of directors. In doing so the Minister of Traffic sought a composition of the board which on a basis of confidence could ease the relationship between the state and A/S Storebæltsforbindelsen. The membership was as follows: the managing director of a large Danish multinational company (Chairman) the president of the Danish Metal Workers' Union (Deputy Chairman) the managing director of the Danish Industrial Employers' Association a former Minister of Finance, now managing director of Copenhagen Airport a managing director from Denmark's National Bank the general manager of the Danish State Railways an assistant secretary from The Agency of Environmental Protection a permanent under-secretary from The Road Directorate It seems rather clear that the projected role of board of directors was not to add specific project management expertise to the company organisation - indeed, none of the members were 'fixed-link professionals'. More likely the nomination guarded against areas of potential political unrest - a function, however, which the board only partly managed to fulfil successfully during the project. In fact the introduction of the above mentioned political monitoring committee could indicate that the autonomy of the board of directors became overshadowed - within A/S Storebæltsforbindelsen the committee has consequently been referred to as "the upper board". And it had actually been laid down in the Public Act (as a provision for the parliament compromise itself) that the political insight should not be diminished as a result of the new concession-like set-up! The establishment of this stratified client organisation obviously added new complexities to the communication lines of the project. Not surprisingly the opinions on its efficiency now differ considerably. But the rationale was quite precisely expressed by the chairman of the board: that if the monitoring task was not treated on a consensus basis within the political committee "...then instead we would have these perpetual discussions in the parliament ...". According to Andreassen and Bundgaard Nielsen one piece of evidence of the well-functioning interplay between the "two boards" is represented by the substantial environmental improvements which were added to the project after the Act first passed in Parliament. However, more critical public voices have stated that the political committee possessed no real influence in such matters but merely served to "... legitimise the decisions which already were taken by the board on the basis of its detail knowledge". From a technology and project management point of view, however, the Board’s exploitation of the new organisational lines of action seems quite logical : their understanding of the new client set-up was exactly focused on the shift of politicians’ influence from detailed to general control level. Thus in daily practise the board could, whenever appropriate, insist on already taken (political) decisions or pursue convenient changes on more operational foundations.