CHRONOLOGY OF THE STOREBÆLT FIXED LINK

Bridges have a way of coming in shoals (Axél 1992). This saying has proved its validity in twentieth century Denmark. During a short inter-war period in the thirties two very large bridges were constructed, linking up major regions of the Danish insular topography. One of these, Storstrømsbroen, with its 3.5 km full length is among Europe=s largest. Whereas it can be assumed that the profound economic depression of the thirties released decisive political support for these projects, this activity generating perspective cannot alone explain the second major shoal of bridges towards the end of this century, the Storebælt and the Øresund fixed links, which are now under construction, (and with vast probabili-ty encompassing also a Femern Belt link). In most exceptional fixed link projects, for instance the Channel tunnel (see Working Paper 11), the conceptualisation of the first proposals can historically be traced back to the boundless visions of industrialisation in its childhood. The idea of a fixed link across Storebælt was first presented to the Danish parliament mid-19th century by war minister Tscherning, obviously emphasising the military strategic gains inherent in the project! Throughout Danish history the notion of east and west Denmark was indeed constituted by the Storebælt, some 20 km wide, between the eastern island Zealand with the capital Copenhagen and the western island Funen, which is linked to the main land Jutland. With Zealand=s geographical and cultural proximi-ty to Scandinavia and Jutland being part of the European mainland, the Storebælt has politically been associated with a wall of water impeding steady and homogenous development of national unity. However, the significance of this conception should be seen primarily as ideological wrapping to much more tangible arguments in the fixed link decision debate. (Nevertheless at a certain point in the decision process, when the demand for an Øresund link was strongly put forward by in particular Swedish multinational industrial interests, the anxiety about national unity was accepted as a definite reason for a political agreement stating that the Storebælt link should be constructed first of the two.) Not surprisingly the steady development of car-based transport technology and its significant growth rates from the post-war years and onwards have represented the dominant themes in this debate. The first government board, specifically appointed to work on a fixed link solution to traffic problems on the Storebælt, was set up in consequence of the ice-winter in 1947, which hindered all traffic between east and west Denmark for weeks. Already at that time the board=s working premises were changing rapidly: more than a doubling of car crossings in three years from 110.000 in 1948 to 300.000 in 1951 (Axél 1992 p. 15). Already at that time the debate among professionals concerning the technical design of a fixed link identified a variety of construction methods, which were all considered technologically practicable but of course more or less economically realistic. A bored tunnel as well as a suspended bridge and the idea of using the island Sprogø as a technology split point were put on the agenda in the discussion. It may be claimed that - although a rather traditional lattice bridge was finally proposed by the board in 1959 - the concept of a composite fixed link matured from that time as a result of public and industrial interests gradually focusing their preferences on the features of the different types of technology. On the basis of the board's recommendations the first law on Storebælt passed the Parliament in 1961, initiating technical investigations and design proposals and determining the link to be completed by 1975! During the 60s a variety of technical solutions was again explored in an international design contest, and the idea of transporting car traffic in a railway tunnel proposed was for the first time put on the agenda in the Storebælt decision process. This was the so-called "tunnel/ferry construction" which later on the Channel Tunnel project developed into the shuttle concept, however, still did not receive much interest. Gradually as the parliamentary committee evaluated the 144 contest entries on the background of the professional and political attitudes in the 60s the lattice bridge design was abandoned in favour of a cable-stayed or a suspension bridge. The technical discussion around this shift primarily focused on the need for free span across Østerrenden, the heavily trafficked sea lane between Sprogø and Zealand. Hereby, however, was introduced a decision process deadlock : the greater the span needed to reduce collision risk, the more difficult it became to design a combined car-railway bridge (due to the load stress associated with train traffic). Inherent in this relation of interdependence was the solution achieved many years later; meanwhile it was of course exploited strategically by actors trying to optimise their specific interests in the process. Furthermore, in 1970, a new technical committee, (the Jespersen-Committee) had been appointed and commissioned to provide an economic basis for a parliamentary resolution. The committee's cost-benefit calculations, however, gave no clear preference to any of the technical alternatives, basically they were all considered profitable. Contrary to the seemingly endless discussions about the design of this eastern part of the link, (in which the controversial idea of constructing a separate tunnel for railway traffic became more and more persistant), the proposals for the crossing of the western water Vesterrenden between Sprogø and Fünen quite early concentrated on a combined railway and car traffic low-level bridge. Then finally, in 1973, the Danish Parliament adopted a resolution, empowering the Minister of Public Works "to build a bridge across Storebælt". As could be expected the open-ended issue of the technical design of the entire link was not specifically reflected in this resolution, which simply stated that the link should consist of an eastern high level and a western low-level bridge, both intended for railway and car traffic. The inherent technical problems, which obviously could not be solved without further substantial political and financial considerations, were hereby brought to an interim political agreement, clarifying primarily that the fixed link should be completed. Nevertheless the resolution did embrace more radical elements, concerning specifications for the organisational and financial set-up of the construction project. Thus two innovations in the context of public works in Denmark were introduced: the establishing of a state-owned company Statsbroen Storebælt which as client was to build and run the bridge, and secondly a financial model based on state guaranteed loans and toll earnings. Hitherto in Denmark, the ministry's Road Directorate had acted exclusively as client and administrative authority on infrastructure traffic projects; likewise their funding and operation costs would always be covered by public tax revenues. The new concession-like approach to these two issues in fact passed almost unmodified into the actual realisation of the link more than 10 years later (Axél 1992, p.19). But the intention of the 1973 resolution, namely that the bridge should be completed by 1986, began deteriorating already during that year's autumn when the first oil crisis struck the traffic forecasts of the Jespersen Committee. Thus one of the first assignments of the newly established concessionaire - Statsbroen Storebælt - was to recalculate traffic development and to evaluate energy consumption on the various fixed link solutions in relation to a continued ferry service. In this period the energy issue in fact raised public concerns about environmental matters more broadly, and as the grass-root movements quickly converted into momentous lobby organisations this meant also a unification and focusing of the scattered groups of fixed link opponents. In 1975, however, the Statsbroen Storebælt report concluded that a fixed link would still be economically lucrative. Furthermore a combination of the reduced traffic level and the emergence of new shuttle technologies seemed to tilt the balance in favour of a plain railway link service across the belt. This statement of course revived the public discussion about the project, whilst at the same time a rapidly growing number of actors appeared at the scene of debate. However, in 1976 the Parliament confirmed its previous decision by which the concessionaire could commence pre-design and further technical investigations for a combined link. In a report on national investments, issued by the Ministry of Finance in 1977, problems in the national economy - in particular concerning trade balance deficit -were exposed. The ministry was anxious about the inflationary effects of two planned huge investments in infrastructure - the fixed link and the national natural gas network - which accidentally now seemed to take off simultaneously. An order of priority was consequently recommended. This issue became crucial after parliamentary elections in 1978 as it was put on the agenda in the government negotiations between the Liberals and the Social Democrats. As an element in a complex political deal, a five year postponement of the fixed link was agreed in favour of the natural gas network before these two odd partners could join a coalition government! In the following years the Danish political environment was generally very confused, and the fixed link planning process once again became an arena of political manifestations, which at times seemed to set the whole project back to square one. The largest political party, the Social Democrats (SD), was decisively deposed when the first non-socialist government for thirty years was formed in 1982. The SDs, however, could then abandon previous positions on design solutions in order to regain voters' support for the party, and old SD issues like public transport at the expense of private cars were reintroduced - matching conveniently the rapidly increasing public awareness of environmental matters, to which otherwise the Socialist Peoples' Party further to the left in parliament were anxiously trying to address themselves. Thus, as late as in 1984, a parliamentary resolution on renewed technical investigations for the fixed link was in fact being impeded by the SDs, whose votes were needed by the minority government. Restraining the planning process further was the split among the non-socialist parties, of which in particular the Liberals in the coalition government were conducting a rather sceptical policy towards the fixed link. Nevertheless the incremental build-up of technological knowledge during this period was gradually pointing towards new solutions to the design controversy. The bored tunnel technology which had finally gained acceptance due to the Channel Tunnel project now became an important shield against the numerous water environmentally based arguments in the debate, representing the ultimate zero-impact solution. Then in 1985, obviously triggering the decisive developments towards renewed political agreement, the Minister of Traffic, who represented a small ultra pro- car party, made what could be characterised a tactical move when he presented to parliament a proposal for huge investments in an urgent renovation of the existing car and railway ferryboat systems on the Storebælt. The old political majority behind the fixed link apparently experienced a crisis, to which the only answer was a speeding up of the fixed link project. The final legitimising steps included an investigation of the environmental impacts of the link and then, in June 1986, the four parties in the non-socialist government on one side and the Social Democrats from the opposition on the other side, joined in a compromise of remarkable content - the time-lagged combined fixed link. This agreement was confirmed in a Public Works Act of June 1987. The pragmatism of this act concerned the variety of design solutions as well as their scheduled time of completion. Obviously for the Vesterrenden a combined car and railway low-level bridge was fixed, whereas the link across Østerrenden was to comprise a railroad tunnel and for car traffic either an elevated bridge or an immersed tunnel. By scheduling the railway link to be completed three years ahead of the road link - in 1993 compared to 1996 - it was furthermore anticipated to improve the competitiveness of public transport and its operator, The Danish State Railways. This Social Democratic strategy later suffered severe defeats due to technical problems. In January 1987 the state owned client A/S Storebæltsforbindelsen wass established as a BOOT-company and the final design considerations concerning primarily environmental questions were completed. Thus from 1988 the following main link elements were being prepared for tender by the client's design organisation: the railway tunnel, The East Tunnel, total length 8 km, under the Østerrenden between Zealand and Sprogø to be constructed either as a bored tunnel or as an immersed concrete or steel tunnel. the combined road and rail bridge, The West Bridge, total length 6.6 km, across Vesterrenden between Funen and Sprogø, as an all-concrete bridge. a elevated motorway bridge, The East Bridge, across Østerrenden, total length 6.7 km.