CONCLUSIONS: THE RIGIDITIES OF FLEXIBILITY

This paper has attempted to describe the contemporary system in the British construction industry, characterising it as a professional system, showing how it has evolved out of the earlier craft and trade systems, and how it exists alongside the speculative system for the provision of private sector housing. This professional system is now on the cusp of change. There is widespread dissatisfaction with its performance from its clients, and an extensive programme of research and reform has now been implemented. Outside of this programme, the development of public policy with regard to concession contracting is also likely to lead to significant changes in the structure of the industry and the organisation of projects. However, these dynamics of changes are rooted in the existing professional system, and it is worthwhile identifying here the structure of that system so as to provide a basis for further analysis. In so doing it has taken Marx's aphorism seriously - it is simply not possible to understand the forces currently at work in the British construction industry without understanding how it has arrived at the present cusp. The development of the professional system over the last 150 years or so has led to an industry of remarkable flexibility, a capacity reinforced over the last 20 years by the development of mediated procurement routes. The sustained, and even growing, global market share of UK construction firms - both professional and contracting - demonstrates that many of the leading firms in the industry are of a world class standard. On the rather inadequate evidence of comparative studies, the UK industry stands alongside that of the leading European nations, joint second to that of the United States, in its overall performance. The performance on programme and quality criteria of the industry is, so far as can be judged, generally good in comparison to that in other advanced countries. The principal area of weakness would appear to be that the outturn cost of construction in the UK is relatively high for similar building types. We simply do not know enough to identify the causes of this, but the evidence to date points to a combination of relatively high quality, coupled with relatively low productivity. Given that the leaders amongst the different types of actor in the system are competitive internationally, this suggests that it is their interactions within the professional system itself which are the root of the problem. Thus it is suggested that the dynamics of the system create a logic of action which motivates overspecification (i.e. inappropriate levels of quality of specification and quality of conception), and fails to motivate cost saving innovation. It is this same logic of action which generates the adversarial relationships which clients find so distasteful and frustrating. Flexibility and productivity are related through a paradox (Winch 1994). Strategies to maximise flexibility usually imply investment in general purpose machines, working in networks of consortium and subcontract, and the employment of labour on a casual basis. In essence. Flexibility is achieved in two ways - through fragmenting the production process between larger and larger numbers of different actors in networks of short-term relationships, and by avoiding capital lock-up by minimising investment in physical and human capital. The logic of action minimises longer term commitments, because it is assumed that different sets of relationships will be required for the next project than on the last. It is this emphasis upon flexibility that has led construction to become seen by many commentators as a model for the organisation of many manufacturing industries which are facing unprecedented volatility in their markets (see Winch 1993 for a review and critique). However, flexibility comes at a price, for all these choices inherently limit the possibility of innovation. Innovation can only take place within the existing logic of the system - actors either innovate within their own sphere of competence, or innovations are made by new entrants to the industry and become institutionalised through new actors, often in the shape of new professions and new crafts. Any innovation that requires the shared initiative of more than one actor is particularly difficult, because the balance of risk and reward in innovation is usually asymmetrical between actors, and hence leads to winners and losers. Potential winners find their innovative ideas stifled by potential losers. It is in this sense that the flexibility of the British construction industry is also a rigidity - the logic of action of the professional system does not favour the release a dynamic of innovation that will generate sustained cost reduction over time.