THE PROFESSIONAL SYSTEM
The professional system in the UK construction industry became firmly established during the first half of the 19th century. By the eighteen sixties the competitive tendering system was the norm, and "no reputable builder would tender unless quantities were supplied by a recognized quantity surveyor [and] the taking out of quantities required very full working drawings and specifications from the architect" (Summerson 1973 p 13). Architects, engineers, and quantity surveyors had established their professional bodies, while labour was organising itself into craft-based trade unions. Contracts were let on a lump sum basis by competitive tender to master builders who employed many of the trades directly, while sub-contracting for the more specialist ones. Although some general contractors such as Myers (Spencer-Silver 1993) worked closely with particular architects - particularly Pugin - and did not have to tender for all their contracts, this was the exception.
Over the subsequent period the system was reinforced - the surveyors acquired their charter in 1881 as the Surveyors Institution, and became the Royal Institution in 1946. Although the accuracy of the bill of quantities method had been proven with the rebuilding of the Palace of Westminster after the fire of 1834, it was not until 1922 that a Standard Method of Measurement was finally agreed, although the Scottish surveyors in Edinburgh had had one since 1773 (Thompson 1968). The IBA received its charter in 1837, and in 1931, "architect" became a protected title. The first standard form of construction contract was issued by the RIBA in 1903. Eventually the task of developing such standard forms was taken over by the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT) after its foundation in 1931, and the professional system became firmly institutionalised in its series of standard forms.
The main changes over the next century or so were associated with the increasing role of the state, particularly as a client, and technological changes. The state grew in importance as a client in three ways. Firstly, the role of the municipalities in the governance of the country grew in importance, creating a demand for town halls and other civic buildings. Secondly, the state provided more and more services directly - in education, increasingly in health, and especially in housing. Thirdly, the state took over from private promoters the development of infrastructure and thereby became the dominant client for civil engineering works. The general effect of these developments was to reinforce the features of the professional system, ensuring that the position of the professionalised actors was protected, and that competitive tendering on price was the predominant way to select a contractor.
Technological changes led to a proliferation of both professions and crafts. As the buildings became more complex, their structural design presented challenges beyond the skills of the architect, and the Institution of Structural Engineers was formed in 1922, receiving its Royal Charter in 1934. Further changes in the post-war period towards much more highly serviced buildings lead to the growth of the services engineering profession, and the old Institution of Heating and Ventilating Engineers received a similar status as the Chartered Institute of Building Services Engineers in 1978. As late as the 1930s, an architect in a small practice such as Grenfell-Baines, the founder of BDP, would typically calculate the structure and the size the services. This would be very unusual today.
Technological changes also affected the general contractor, leading to a much greater reliance upon subcontracting (Cooney 1993). New types of structure meant that the role of the traditional structural trades - bricklayers and masons - became less important, while new materials reduced the role of the carpenter. Plumbing had always been subcontracted, and new services such as electricity, climatisation, and, more recently network cabling, have all encouraged general contractors to rely upon trade contractors for growing proportions of their contract values. Perhaps inspired by these trends, general contractors increasingly turned to subcontracting for their traditional trades. Now few, if any general contractors directly employ labour preferring to rely upon specialist trade or labour-only subcontractors instead.
However, these changes did little to change the organisation of labour which remained reminiscent of the craft system. New skills simply meant new crafts, rather than reorganisation of the work process. The principal challenge to the craft-based division of labour on site - the industrialised building of the nineteen sixties - failed to be established. Thus technological innovation also reinforced the developing features of the professional system. It spawned new professions and new crafts and encouraged subcontracting. Innovation had to adapt to the system, rather than the system adapting to innovation. Indeed, as Bowley (1966) and Thompson (1968) argue, the system did much to stifle innovation. For instance, steel structures took a long time to diffuse due to the aesthetic prejudices of architects; the separation of architects and civil engineers, the choice of architect by appointment rather than competition; and the inability of contractors to take the lead in innovation due to the level of detail provided by architects; and the role of quantity surveyors.
The shift to general contracting led to new forms of work organisation as workers became employees rather than artisans. Few followed Cubitt's example of vertical integration by establishing a permanently employed workforce backed by large workshops producing materials and components, preferring to employ labour casually as required. Until the 1870s payment was usually by the day, and the major struggles revolved around the battle for the nine-hour day (Price 1980). As economic pressures mounted during the recession of the 1880s, the general contractors increasingly shifted towards labour-only subcontracting outside the scope of agreements with the unions. This trend was very much in the opposite direction from those industries which were abandoning internal contracting during the period, but in the absence of technological change, the general contractors sought to intensify work rather than reorganise. The continuing organisation of work on a craft basis facilitated this shift, and the period between 1890 and 1914 saw a considerable expansion of this form of labour organisation.
Various institutions of regulation were established during the latter quarter of the century, but the full panoply of institutionalised collective bargaining was not put in place until the post-war settlement after 1918. The trade unions organised on the basis of the individual crafts, although they were all members of an industry federation formed in 1918 (Postgate 1923). This new form of regulation succeeded in largely removing LOSC from general contracting, but it revived again during the boom of the 1960s, and is now a permanent feature of the UK construction labour market. From the 1950s on the institutions of labour regulation in the industry became increasingly irrelevant to the setting of terms and conditions of employment; there is now no effective regulation of the construction labour market by the social partners and the annual bargaining round is merely formal.
It was not until the nineteen sixties that the professional system began to change in Britain. Until 1967, only one standard form (JCT 63; the predecessor of JCT 80) was available. Innovations in tendering procedures were made, particularly a shift towards selective rather than open competitive tendering, and the first applications of a new form of procurement imported from the United States - management contracting - were made. However, it was in the 1980s that the pace of change speeded. Perhaps for the first time for over a century, change was led by private sector rather than public sector clients. In particular, the conditions of the property boom of the mid to late eighties encouraged innovation. First management contracting, and then construction management were increasingly used. Package dealing also found an expanding market. However, these innovations were largely confined to the building sector, and the organisation of civil engineering remained along traditional lines.
The so-called management forms are, in an important sense, further refinements of the professional system - indeed the principal US textbook on the topic is entitled Professional Construction Management (Barrie and Paulson 1993). Much of the enthusiasm from these new forms from the contractor side comes from the fact that they professionalise the role of the general contractor. They do this in two ways. Firstly, the contractor is normally appointed on a fee basis in a similar way to the traditional professions. Secondly, The general contractor, or perhaps more accurately, the principal contractor, does not undertake the work itself, but lets it in packages to trade contractors who are in contract directly with the client. It makes no profit from the site process itself. For these two reasons, many argue that the contractor is now on an equal basis with the traditional professionals - Bowley's hierarchy is no more. The traditional professionals remain in independent contract with the client, although their role is often reduced, with more design being done by the trade contractors. There is a sense in which construction management represents something of a return towards the trade system.
Bowley concluded her study by advocating package deals as the way forward for the UK industry. In recent years they have become increasingly popular with a number of clients. However, closer examination shows that the growth of what is normally known as design and build falls far short of Bowley's specification of a package deal in which "the person who puts forward a design should be responsible for carrying it out.... at a price offered with the design" (1966 p 442). Many current package deal contracts leave considerable scope for traditional architectural duties, and merely transfer site risks more clearly to the contractor, without giving the contractor the freedom to innovate to absorb those risks. The next section will discuss these issues in more detail.