CONCLUSIONS

The study of the construction industry offers a considerable opportunity for the exploration of collaborative transaction governance. Much of Williamson's own attention has recently been directed to bilateral forms such as franchises, and franchise bidding problems. Other work on collaborative transaction governance forms has tended to be vague in terms of its specification of how transactions are being governed. The wide variety of third party actors, and the complexity of standard contract types suggests a considerable sophistication in trilateral transaction governance. In addition, the development of concession contracting for public infrastructure, and partnering for experienced clients suggests that new challenges of bilateral transaction governance may be emerging. The study of international consortia in European construction provides a particularly fertile ground for exploring these issues. The actors in the consortia bring different skills and different cultures to the project organisation, and the dynamics of these pose considerable management problems. Additionally the consortia as principal contractors form coalitions with designers on the one hand, and subcontractors on the other. In pursuit of these enquiries, the key research questions would appear to turn around relations with the client; the internal dynamics of the principal contractor consortium in the context of the project coalition; conflict resolution procedures and the role of third party actors; and the dynamics of the project delivery process. It is these issues that the Groupe Bagnolet are presently exploring in their five case studies.